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ABSTRACT 
Organizational ecology is a fast growing domain in organization theory. 
During the past few years, the theory has evolved from a collection of 
rather unrelated concepts towards an integrated model of  failure and 
founding,  which has been tested with advanced empirical  techniques. 
Despite this increasing convergence within the ecological boundaries, 
little integration occurs with other intellectual streams which can either be 
considered as complementary to  the density dependence model or as a 
challenge to  the basic assumptions of this model. This paper presents 
both a review of  the theoretical and empirical methods developed during 
the past five years and an assessment offuture research opportunities: can 
institutional theory, strategic management and industrial economics enrich 
and stretch the boundaries of  the ecological model? 
INTRODUCTION 
Population ecology represents a collection of theoretical concepts such as resource 
partitioning, niche theory, density dependence, most of which were introduced in 
Hannan and Freeman's seminal paper on the population ecology of organizations 
(1977).  Especially the density dependence model, which states that the competing 
processes of legitimation and competition create a curvilinear relationship between 
organizational foundings and dissolutions, received much empirical attention in the 
early and mid-eighties. 
This emerging stream of research resulted in a first review by Carroll (1984), who 
placed the population ecology in general and density dependence in particular in a 
broader theoretical perspective. Elaborating on the three levels of analysis, which were 
initially described  by Hannan and Freeman (1977: 933-934) -- the organization, the 
population and the community --, he stressed the need to introduce variables at each of 
these levels in further empirical research. Since then, the growing body of empirical 
research  which combined these  levels of analysis was  classified  under the  term 
organizational ecology. 
In 1990, a second review on organizational ecology was co-authored by Singh and 
Lumsden. In this work, they comprehensively classified the empirical research into 
studies of foundings, disbandings and organizational change. In addition, they analyzed 
which of the theoretical concepts (such as resource partitioning, density dependence, 
--2--liability of smallness, liability of newness  ... ) were most frequently tested in those 
studies. Consistent with the historic evolution of the field, they found that the density 
dependence model  was  the most well-researched model, especially in studies of 
organizational mortality. Unfortunately, this very same model turned out to be also the 
most controversial concept of population ecology (Delacroix and Rao,  1994). As a 
response, it was suggested that future research should on the one hand further explore 
the density variable at different levels of analysis (such as the community versus the 
population) ; while on the other hand much more research was needed to explore the 
other theoretical concepts, especially in studies of founding and organizational change. 
Both the increased availability of detailed data and the presence of these theoretical 
concepts, waiting to  be tested, has stimulated an exponential number of empirical 
efforts in this field. In addition, the increasing visibility of this research stream attracted 
scholars from other fields both inside (e.g. institutionalism, neo-institutionalism) and 
outside sociology (e.g. strategic management) to jump on the ecological bandwagon. In 
turn, this snowball effect has recently stimulated scholars in organization ecology to 
combine some of their concepts with established theories in industrial  economics, 
technology management and organization theory. 
But not only did organizational ecology converge with other domains at the 
theoretical end of the spectrum. An increasing number of researchers borrowed and 
introduced empirical models and techniques from other domains. For instance, whereas 
empirical studies of the density dependence model without exception used a form of 
event history model to analyze the impact of density on organizational mortality, more 
recent efforts applied fixed and random effects models -- traditionally econometric tools 
-- to study models of organizational change and growth. This mushrooming of efforts 
has  significantly blurred both the theoretic and empirical research boundaries of 
organizational ecology. 
As a result, during the nineties, major theoretical and empirical advances have 
significantly contributed to the theory. Consistent with the two previous reviews, this 
paper not only aims to describe comprehensively the major developments made in the 
theory, especially during the nineties, but it also tries to evaluate and classify these 
efforts in different distinct categories and to formulate directions for future research. In 
addition and in contrast to the two previous reviews, however, which solely concentrate 
on the theoretical part of the field, this review also describes and critically evaluates the 
developments in empirical methods and techniques which have become more prominent 
during the last years. To this end, the paper is organized in two main parts: the first part 
focuses on the development of theoretical concepts and the convergence of these 
--3--concepts with theoretical ideas from industrial economics,  strategic management, 
instutionalist theory and technology management. The second part focuses as well on 
the empirical techniques which have been developed to test the main hypothesis and 
their  integration  with  econometric  regression  methods  as  on  the  empirical 
operationalization of the theoretical concepts proposed in the first part. 
PART I:  THEORETICAL  CONCEPTS AND  MODELS 
1.1. THE BASIC DENSITY -DEPENDENCE MODEL 
In their seminal paper on population ecology, Hannan and Freeman (1977) have 
introduced  a  novel  model  to  study  the  impact of density,  i.e.  the  number of 
organizations in a population, on mortality and founding rates. Underlying is the Lotka-
Volterra Model of population growth, which assumes a linear relationship between 
mortality rate and population size.  In the early stages of a population or an industry (or, 
more in general, a new domain, Gray, 1985), growth in numbers 'legitimates' this kind 
of population, thereby increasing the founding rate of new organizations and decreasing 
their mortality  rate.  However,  as  density  continues  to  increase,  competition 
overwhelms legitimation and decreases founding rates while increasing dissolution 
rates. In addition to the time-varying density, almost all initial models also include a 
measure of 'density at the time of founding'. This population ecology argument dates 
back to Stinchcombe (1965), who has argued that the 'features acquired by founding 
are carried by organizations throughout their life cycles'. Organizations that enter an 
industry or are founded under 'high density'-conditions cannot build up sufficient slack 
resources and remain very vulnerable to changes in the environment. 
Concluding, we can state that the baseline 'population ecology' model makes four 
claims (Hannan and Carroll, 1992 ; Miner, 1993, p. 356-357): 
Density at time of founding permanently  increases  mortality  rates  (and decreases 
founding rates). 
Contemporaneous density has a curvilinear effect on founding rates, increasing them at 
low levels, but decreasing them at high levels and an equally nonrnonotonic relationship 
with failure rates, initially decreasing them but eventually increasing them. 
----INSERT HGURE 1 ABOUT HERE----
Part A in figure 1 represents this baseline density dependence model. Part A, Band 
C include the further extensions of the model which will be discussed later on in this 
--4--paper.  An excellent review of the  studies that focus  on the  density dependence 
hypothesis can be found in Singh and Lumsden (1990: 174-175) and more recently in 
Delacroix and Rao (1994:  256-257). Table 1 is an updated summary of Singh and 
Lumsden's review of density dependence. 
----INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE----
1.2. DENSITY DEPENDENCE REVISITED 
Despite its increasing popularity, the density dependence model has received major 
criticism both on a theoretical (Zucker, 1991  ; Barnett and Amburgey, 1990) and an 
empirical basis (Petersen and Koput,  1991). Zucker (1991)  argued that population 
ecology misuses the concept of legitimacy to attach an ex post explanation to the 
empirical finding of curvilinearity (between density and rate of founding/mortality). 
However, there is no theoretical basis to explain this concept of legitimacy, nor have 
population ecologists operationalized the concept in measurable variables. Next, the 
density variable, which is a mere count of numbers, represents a very naive view on the 
concept of competition (Barnett and Amburgey, 1990). Indeed, density suggests that 
each organization, regardless of size, influences competition in a similar way. This 
result is  not only counter-intuitive. Also does economic theory suggest that larger 
organizations have a different impact on competition than smaller ones. 
On the empirical side, Petersen and Koput (1991) have shown (through a large 
number of simulations) how unobserved heterogeneity can account for the decreasing 
part of the mortality-rate curve. Unobserved heterogeneity stands for the specification 
bias, which results from omitting one or more variables from  the data set that are 
known or believed to be correlated with the dependent variable. 
These critiques have inspired scholars of the density dependence model to extend 
the model in many creative ways. Especially, the problem of unobserved heterogeneity 
has received much attention. Interestingly, dealing with this problem has led to the 
convergence of the density dependence model with other theoretical concepts such as 
liability of small- and newness and resource partitioning.  Studies have linked the 
theoretical rationale behind these concepts with indicators of unobserved heterogeneity, 
both at the level of the firm and the subpopulation. In contrast, population ecology itself 
seemed to be much less able to address the theoretical questions related to the concepts 
of competition and legitimation. But the mechanism behind competition has been a 
--5--major focus of interest in industrial economics (Tirole,  1988) and legitimacy has 
received most attention in institutional theories of organization (Zucker, 1987 ; Gray, 
1985). 
In the next two paragraphs we will discuss how population ecologists have dealt 
with the issues of unobserved heterogeneity through the introduction of variables at the 
firm and niche level (see part C and D of figure 1). In the third and fourth paragraph of 
this section, we will analyze the convergence of population ecology with economic and 
institutional theory. 
1.2.1. UNOBSERVED HEfBROGENEITY AT THE FIRM LEVEL:  INTRODUCINGTHE 
CONCEPTS UABILITY OF NEWNESS AND llABILITY OF SMALLNESS IN DENSITY 
DEPENDENCE MODELS. 
Liability of  Newness  versus Liability of  Senescence 
The'  age' of an organization has been used as one of the first variables to capture 
unobserved differences  between firms.  The theoretical  explanation goes  back to 
Stinchcombe's (1965) observations that new organizations have higher failure rates 
than older ones, which is known as  the 'liability of newness'. Hannan and Freeman 
(1984) have subsequently made the same observation, which they explained by an 
evolutionary argument: They argued that in modem societies organizations with high 
levels of 'reliability' and 'accountability' are favored by selection processes. Singh and 
Lumsden summarized (1990: 168): 
'Reliability and accountability of organizational forms require that the organizational 
structure be highly reproducible.  Due both to processes  of internal  learning, 
coordination, and socialization within the organization and to external legitimation 
and development of webs of exchange, the reproducibility of organization structure 
increases with age. Because greater reproducibility of structure also leads to greater 
inertia,  however, organizations become increasingly  inert with age.  And since 
selection processes favor organizations with inert structures, organizational mortality 
rates decrease with age -- the liability of newness ... .' 
Most of the early studies that included age as an explanatory variable have found a 
significant negative (monotonic or in some particular cases non-monotonic or inverted-
U shaped) relation between age and mortality (which supports the liability of newness 
hypothesis).  Regardless of the direction of this relationship, the fact that age has a 
significant relationship with mortality suggests that the variable might count for part of 
the unobserved heterogeneity.  In a reply to  Petersen and Koput (1991),  Hannan, 
Barron and Carroll (1991:411) reported: 
--6--'when age is controlled, only three of ten replications have a significant negative 
effect of density. 'Ibis result leads us to question Petersen and Koput's assertions that 
the unobserved heterogeneity explanation is conservative and that spurious density 
dependence will generally be true in the presence of negative age effects at the 
organizational level.' 
Still, despite this reply and the subsequent use of age as a control variable in many 
new density dependence studies, both the use of age as an operationalization of the 
liability of newness concept and as a solution to the unobserved heterogeneity problem 
remains controversial at least. First, age is used as a proxy for a number of processes 
which  may  but  also  may  not  be  correlated  with  it.  For instance  the  speed  of 
development of organizational routines is likely to differ between organizations due to 
structural and cultural factors. Hence, the variation of these processes for organizations 
of the same age cohort might be so large that age turns out to be a very poor construct. 
On the other hand, other unobserved variables (e.g. size, financial resources) might be 
better correlated with the age variable than those which belong to the liability of 
newness hypothesis strictu sensu. 
Second, the 'birth' of an organization is not an idiosyncratic instance, such as the 
birth of a biological species. In general, two different dates of origin can be defined: 
Following the economic tradition, one can define the age of an organization or business 
unit as the number of years that organization or business unit has spent in this particular 
industry or population. In this case, the focal organization might be a newly founded 
start-up, or a newly founded business unit of a parent which already exists in another 
population or industry. Second, age can be defined as the number of years elapsed 
since the founding of the ultimate parent, regardless of the population or industry in 
which this parent was founded. In the first case, the liability of newness refers to the 
industry-specific routines which have  been created, while in the second case the 
organization-specific routines are the central factor of interest.  Although there are 
examples of density-dependence studies which use one of both operationalizations of 
age (see Table 2), as far as we know, no study has compared them. 
More  recent studies  have challenged the  liability of newness  hypothesis  by 
including size as a control variable (Barron,  West and Hannan,  1994; Carroll and 
Swaminathan,  1992). Although most studies that control for size report a positive 
relationship between age and mortality, in a number of cases, this positive effect was 
not or only marginally significant (Carroll and Swaminathan, 1992). 
Barron, West and Hannan (1994) have called this positive effect the 'liability of 
senescence' which means that older organizations have organizational routines that do 
--7--not fit anymore in the current environment and that henceforth form an overhead cost 
which makes the organizations more vulnerable towards acquisition. In earlier work, 
Carroll (1983) had already tried to explain a similar finding by introducing the 'liability 
of obsolescence' concept. Basically, he states that (p. 313): 
'organizational age will coincide roughly with the amount of environmental change 
experienced by an organization. If  this tendency holds on average and core structures 
are "imprinted in youth", then older cohorts of organizations have lower fitness in the 
current environment. If this image of organizational development is  right,  then 
mortality rates increase with age.' 
As a  conclusion, we can state that the liability of newness or the liability of 
senescence  may count for  some of the  unobserved  heterogeneity.  However, 
organizational size seems to be a better variable. Although recent research seems to 
favor the liability of senescence hypothesis, the positive relationship between age and 
mortality rates is sometimes based on a marginal significance (see Table 2). 
----INSERT TABlE 2 ABOUT HERE----
Liability of  Smallness 
As suggested in the previous paragraph, size might be a better variable to capture 
unobserved heterogeneity. The relationship between size and mortality is known as the 
liability of smallness hypothesis. The theoretic rationale behind this hypothesis dates 
back to Hannan and Freeman's original paper on population ecology (1977), in which 
they state that 'the appropriate time scale for a selection process increases with the size 
of the organizations under consideration'. Population ecologists have given two main 
reasons for this liability of smallness phenomenon. A first explanation is given in Singh 
and Lumsden's review (1990: 176): 
' .... the level of structural inertia increases with size  .... since selection processes in 
modem societies are such that they favor organizations with greater structural inertia 
(i.e. inert organizations have lower mortality rates) larger organizations must have 
lower mortality rates .. .' 
Barron et al (1994:388) analyze the liability of smallness hypothesis from a slightly 
different point of view  ... 
' .. .large organizations can retrench by reducing their scale of operations over long 
periods of poor performance before they are forced to disband. Small organizations 
have little room to contract, and they fail quickly once fortunes decline .. .' 
--8--Other explanations focus on the fact that large organizations have more 'slack 
resources' on which they can rely during periods of environmental change (Haveman, 
1993). Slack resources facilitate experimentation with new strategies and products and 
facilitate entrance in new markets because it buffers organizations from downside risks. 
Most of the early empirical studies support the 'liability of smallness hypothesis' 
(i.e.  negative  monotonic  effect of size  on  mortality  rates),  which  has  become 
conventional wisdom in organizational theory. The liability of smallness hypothesis 
was also consistent a  long  tradition of empirical  economic  studies  on the  size 
distribution of firms.  This stream of research,  which  was  initiated by Simon and 
Bonini's seminal article (Simon and Bonini, 1958), had traditionally found that in most 
industries the distribution is lognormal. Although most economists relied on Gibrat's 
law of proportionate growth  to  explain this  kind  of distribution,  the  lognormal 
distribution is also the result if the liability of smallness hypothesis receives support. 
For example, small organizations might face consistently more problems than large 
organizations, which increases their mortality rates. 
The availability of larger and better data sets, however, has resulted in a number of 
studies which suggested that the correct relationship between size and mortality is a 
non-monotonic one, which means that neither Gibrat's law nor the liability of newness 
hypothesis  receive  unrestricted  support  (Evans,  1987;  Hall,  1987;  Wholey, 
Christianson and Sanchez, 1992). Other studies on the other hand still find a monotonic 
relationship between size and mortality (Barron, West and Hannan, 1994). 
Resource partitioning theory, which is another subject of interest in organizational 
ecology, gives a theoretic rationale for such a non-monotonic relationship. Resource 
partitioning suggests that mortality rates will be highest for organizations in the center 
of the size distribution, while lower for those organizations that are more located 
towards the tails of the distribution. The rationale behind this is quite simple: small and 
large organizations use different resources and therefore do not compete with each 
other. Organizations of medium size, however, are stuck in the middle and compete 
both with the small (and often specialized) organizations and the large (and often 
generalist) organizations for the same resources. Therefore one should aspect higher 
mortality rates in this cohort of organizations (Wholey, Christianson and Sanchez, 
1992). Amburgey, Dacin and Kelly (1994) have called this kind a disruptive selection, 
which results in a bimodal size distribution. 
Neo-classic economic theory, in contrast, seems to adhere a U-shaped relationship 
between size and mortality. Economists, in general, state that there exists an 'optimal 
--9--efficient size' at which unit costs of prcxluction are minimized. Failure rates should be 
lowest at this 'optimum' point while increasing when an organization moves towards 
one of the tails (e.g. when it enters the zone of inefficiency). 
Amburgey, Dacin and Kelly (1994) suggested in a recent study that the relation 
between size and mortality is even more complex than a simple U- or inverted U-shaped 
relationship. In fact, the diverse hypotheses suggested by the resource partitioning and 
the liability of smallness concept should  not  be seen as  substitutes,  they  rather 
complement each other. Therefore, they hypothesized that the relationship between size 
and mortality even takes a cubic form.  Their hypothesis was confirmed in a study on 
Credit Unions between 1981-1989 (see Table 3). 
----INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE----
Based on the discussion in the previous two paragraphs, we might conclude that the 
intrcxluction of age and size as explanatory variables in the density dependence mcxlel, 
indeed reduces unobserved heterogeneity but at the same time the relation between age, 
size and mortality seems to be much more complex than initially thought. However, 
introducing age and size in the density dependence mcxlel has had much more profound 
consequences  for organizational  ecology as  an  intellectual  stream  than  simply 
addressing the question of unobserved heterogeneity.  First, it has  blended a set of 
independent theoretical concepts into one coherent mcxlel. Second, the level of analysis 
has thereby changed from the population to the organization (or to be more correct, the 
organization-spell 1  ). This change in the level of analysis opens the door to integrate 
organizational ecology with other streams of research which have traditionally put 
greater emphasis on the organizational level of analysis. Moreover, mixed support for 
both the liability of smallness and newness/senescence hypotheses suggest that a more 
detailed  analysis  is  necessary  (for  instance  making  a  distinction  between 
acquisition/merger, bankruptcy and voluntary liquidation as  different instances of 
disbanding, introducing other variables related to the history of the organization or the 
population). We will return to this integration of organizational ecology with other 
theories in the next paragraphs. 
Of course,  unobserved  heterogeneity  does  not  necessarily  (under  certain 
circumstances can not even) be solved at the micro-level of the single organization. 
Longitudinal data at this level of analysis are difficult to obtain and are sometimes 
completely absent (e.g. when entry rates of start-up firms rather than mortality rates are 
Inamely each time period that an organization is  observed. 
--10--the focal  point of interest).  Therefore,  organizational  ecologists  have started to 
disaggregate the density variable towards the mezzo-level of analysis, that of the 
subpopulation or niche.  It is assumed that organizations in  these  niches form  a 
homogenous set of competitors. In the next paragraph, we will discuss the various 
dimensions along which these niches have been constructed. 
1.2.2. DISAGGREGATING TIlE DENSITY VARIABLE: INTRODUONG TIlE NICHE AS A 
MEzzo-LEvEL OF ANALYSIS 
In organizational ecology, the aggregate 'density' variable models competition as a 
function of the organizational resource requirements. Hence, organizations with equal 
resource requirements are perfect competitors. The more similar the resources required 
by a set of different organizations, the more intense the competition is within this set of 
organizati  ons. 
The aggregate  density  variable  does  not  necessarily  capture  the  effects  of 
'heterogeneity' in resources which may alter the competition between firms. In other 
words, within one industry, there may exist sUbpopulations of organizations that draw 
on different sets of resources to compete within the aggregated population or market. 
Disaggregating the density variable towards the niche level, may correct for unobserved 
heterogeneity problems, both in studies of mortality and founding.  Of course, these 
'niches' directly result from the theoretical shortcoming in organizational ecology to 
define the boundaries of 'homogenous' populations. Indeed, it is very difficult to make 
a theoretical distinction between communities and populations on the one hand and 
populations and niches on the other hand. 
It should also be noted here that the niche concept shows some similarities to the 
strategic group concept as elaborated in the strategic management literature (see McGee 
and Thomas,  1986 for  a  review).  Both concepts  categorize  organizations  into 
competitive  groups.  Niches  differ from  strategic  groups  in  the  instruments  or 
dimensions used to make this categorization. Whereas strategic group researchers use a 
combination of more or less abstract variables such as age, employees, assets, etc., 
organizational ecologists typically select one dimension which seems to be a relevant 
source of heterogeneity in a particular population. Most studies have concentrated on 
one or more of the following three dimensions: location, size and market (although 
there exist isolated examples of other dimensions such as price, composition of the 
board, etc.). 
--11--First, organizational ecologists have used the spatial dimension to identify niches. 
Lacking real theoretical indications, Carroll and Wade (1991) and Swaminathan and 
Wiedenmayer (1991) experimented with a geographic disaggregation of the 'national' 
density variable into statelregion and cities (see also Table 4). Their studies found only 
mixed support for this disaggregation. In a technically appealing effort, Baum and 
Mezias (1992) calculated the average distance of each hotel in the Manhattan hotel 
industry from all other hotels in Manhattan. In doing so, they further refined the spatial 
dimension towards the level of the organization. Their study was interesting in a sense 
that it found positive support for the hypothesis that location matters indeed with respect 
to mortality rates.  But it is  not clear at all  whether bringing the variable to the 
organizational level of analysis really adds so much value. Finally, in a very recent 
study, Lomi (1995) has explicitly linked the geographic disaggregation of the density 
variable with the problem of unobserved heterogeneity (in studies of founding). Also he 
has found strong support for this disaggregation. 
Despite these empirical efforts, geographic disaggregation remains based on weak 
theoretical  grounds.  One of the main reasons for this ambiguity lies in the multi-
dimensional aspect of what organizational ecologists call 'the carrying capacity' of a 
population. The different dimensions of this concept may impose different boundaries 
on the population, which is assumed to be homogenous. For instance, the carrying 
capacity of a  population of semi-conductor start-ups consists of the  universities 
available (technical resources), financial support available (venture capitalists, public 
market, etc  ... ),  human resources available (Ph.D.'s, etc.)  and suppliers available. 
Some of these dimensions are very local (for instance, it is known that highly trained 
personnel prefers  to  stay in the cities  where they  graduated or where first rate 
universities are available), whereas other dimensions are rather global (e.g. US venture 
capitalists operate in the whole US). Unfortunately very little research has been done so 
far to analyze the multi-dimensionality of the carrying capacity concept. We will come 
back to this and some other problems with carrying capacity in the conclusion of this 
paper. 
A much better theoretical explanation exists for dividing organizations in different 
niches based on size. Resource partitioning launches the idea that organizations of 
different sizes use different strategies and structures, although they are engaged in 
similar activities. Therefore, organizations tend to compete most heavily with similarly 
sized organizations.  Hannan and Ranger-Moore (1990)  have  proposed a  way of 
measuring this kind of localized size-density, based on the Euclidean distances between 
the sizes of organizations that operate within a particular size-window (see the empirical 
part of this paper for a more detailed explanation of how to construct such a window). 
--12--The boundaries of the size window then co-incide with the boundaries of a niche. 
Although it is clear why such niches exist, organizational ecology gives little guidance 
in how to define the boundaries of these niches. Following Hannan and Ranger-Moore 
(1990), Baum and Mezias (1992) and Haveman (1993) have empirically determined the 
relative boundaries of a size window. However, there is no conceptual reason why in 
the first place these boundaries should be relative to the size of each organization nor 
what the relative borders of these windows should be (e.g. does an organization still 
compete with organizations which are twice as  big,  or is  this the cut-off point). 
Therefore, the operationalization of these niches along the size distribution remains 
arbitrary. Part of the problem lies in the fact that size is used both as an underlying 
dimension and as a criterion to define the cut-off point. It would be more interesting to 
use other instruments (e.g.  level of diversification,  publicly traded or not, etc.) to 
determine cut-off points on the size distribution. In other words, if for instance larger 
organizations indeed compete in another manner than small ones, then those variables 
that characterize these organizations as big can be used as instruments to define cut-off 
points along the size distribution (e.g. financial resources, product portfolio). 
Finally, a number of studies have used the 'market' as an underlying dimension to 
define niches. In doing so,  they assume that the market can be used as an indirect 
measure of heterogeneity in resources. Baum and Mezias (1992, 1993) have segmented 
the Day Care Centers in Toronto according to the different age categories which those 
Day Care Centres were licensed to serve. This segmentation of markets only differs 
from a pure commercial one in the sense that Baum and Mezias use an 'institutional 
factor' (licenses issued) to form niches. Of course, if this institutional factor is treated 
as an endogenous variable (i.e.  if one assumes that existing Day Care Centers can 
receive new licenses for other segments without much difficulty or cost), then even this 
institutional segmentation turns out to be a commercial one. Barnett (1991), in his study 
of the CEPS industry, has  made a pure  commercial  distinction  between different 
segments of the customer premises and service sector (1981-1986). Using markets or 
potential markets as a way to create niches links organizational ecology with strategic 
management research on differentiation and multi-point competition (Wernerfelt, 1984). 
Barnett (1991) has explicitly made this link with the strategic management theory 
and has modelled the effect of differences between multi- and single-point competitors. 
Baum and Mezias (1992,  1993)  did not go into such detail,  although  they  have 
modelled the extent to  which niches overlap (and hence organizations belong to 
different niches, we refer to the empirical part of this paper for a detailed explanation of 
this construct). 
--13--Table 4 gives a selected overview of the most important findings of those studies 
that have incorporated a disaggregation of the density variable. 
----INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE----
In the previous paragraphs,  we  have occasionally referred  to emerging links 
between organizational ecology and other intellectual streams such as  institutional 
theory, industrial economics and, more in general, the strategic management literature. 
'Unobserved heterogeneity' as a technical term, or the inability of the basic density 
dependence  model  to  explain  sufficiently founding  and  mortality  rates  within a 
population has stimulated researchers to incorporate hypotheses both from within and 
across the boundaries of density dependence.  In the previous paragraphs we have 
mainly discussed the extension of the density dependence model  with theoretical 
concepts  that  were isolated streams  of research  within the  population  ecology 
boundaries.  In the next three sections, we will concentrate on a discussion of how 
population ecologists have started to use concepts from other fields and how, in tum, 
scholars that belonged to these other fields incorporated ecological concepts in their 
models of thought. 
1.2.3. THE BLURRING BOUNDARIES OF ORGANIZATIONAL EcOLOGY: MAKING THE 
BRIDGE WITH INSTITUTIONAL THEORY, INDUSTRIAL ECONONIICS AND STRATEGIC 
MANAGEMENT THEORY 
Organizational Ecology and Institutionalist Theory:  On the Convergence of  Small and 
Large Organizations. 
From its  first appearance on,  population ecology has  been seen as a potential 
supplement to the institutional theory (Zucker, 1987). Meyer and Rowan (1977) already 
hypothesized  that the probability of survival  increases  when  the  organization is 
embedded in an institutionalized environment. However, traditionally, institutionalism 
has  been a theory  for  large  organizations.  Organizational  ecology  provided  the 
opportunity to apply the institutional concepts to a population which consisted both of 
small and large organizations. Carroll and Huo (1986) were among the first to model 
the  institutional  environment as  an explanatory variable for mortality rates in a 
population of newspapers.  Following them,  most organizational studies  included 
changes in the regulatory environment at least as a control variable in their density 
dependence  model.  It took  until  1991  before  hypotheses  were  tested  at the 
organizational level of analysis.  Baum and Oliver (1991) and Miner, Amburgey & 
Steams (1990) measured the impact of the 'institutional' embeddedness on mortality 
rates.  Both studies  have  found  support  for  Meyer and  Rowan's hypothesis  that 
--14--institutional embedded  ness in general enhances chances to survive. In addition to this, 
Baum and Oliver (1991)  have  investigated  the  interaction  between intensity of 
competition and  institutional embeddedness.  They  have  found  that institutional 
embedded  ness is most beneficial under conditions of dense competition. 
Despite these promising efforts, the convergence between institutionalism and 
ecology has been disappointing, so far.  Much effort has been put in the debate of 
legitimacy,  which  has  been  focused  mainly on the  issue  of left-censoring of a 
population's history. In the meanwhile, appealing opportunities have been left aside. 
Aldrich and Fiol (1994) recently developed an interesting framework for research at the 
population level which states that the extent to which entrepreneurs succeed both in 
building intra- and inter-industry links with other organizations (besides linkages with 
the  regulated environment) will  affect the legitimacy building period in emerging 
industries. In this way, they provide a direct measure of legitimacy building beyond the 
mere count of numbers, which is  proposed by organizational ecologists. It is also 
useful to extend this line of thought to the firm level to look how inter-firm differences 
in social actions affect the individual survival chances of an organization. 
In line with the institutional tradition on the adoption of innovation which states that 
adoption can only be explained on a rational basis for the pioneering organizations but 
that as diffusion proceeds the explanatory power of the variables decreases significantly 
(Zucker 1987:453), Haveman (1993a) argued that the decision to diversify (or enter a 
new,  related,  subdomain)  is  largely based on irrational factors  such as  'mimetic 
isomorphism' (Powell and Dimaggio, 1983). In doing so, she includes the institutional 
argument in the density dependence model, applied to a field which was classically the 
work terrain of strategic management scholars, namely that of diversification. This 
increasingly important link between the two fields  will  be the subject of our next 
paragraph. 
----INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE----
Organizational Ecology and Studies of Strategic Change: Incorporating Strategic 
Management in Population Dynamics. 
Disaggregating the density variable towards the niche level of analysis and changing 
the focus of analysis towards the organizational level opens the door to the strategic 
management literature, which has traditionally focused on these levels of analysis. The 
convergence of certain domains in both fields also results from the renewed interest that 
organizational ecologists have shown in strategic change. Research on strategic change 
is not new in organizational ecology however. 
--15--Hannan and Freeman (1984)  posed  three  main  research questions  regarding 
strategic change:  (1) does the probability of organizational change increase when 
confronted with environmental changes? ; (2)  does the probability of organizational 
change decrease over an organization's life cycle? and (3) does the probability of 
organizational failure increase as a result of organizational change? In their model of 
structural inertia, they suggest that forces of inertia will have a different impact on the 
probability of strategic change in the core activities versus strategic change in the 
peripheral activities of organizations. Age and size, which are both used as proxies for 
bureaucratic inertia, are hypothesized to have a  positive effect on change in the 
peripheral activities but a negative one on change in the core activities. It should be 
noted that the distinction between core and peripheral activities is very much related to 
the resource-based view of the firm which is gaining increasing attention in the strategic 
management literature (Wemerfelt, 1984). 
Hannan and Freeman's hypothesis is further investigated in Kelly and Amburgey's 
study of the US certificated air carrier industry between 1938 and 1987 (Kelly and 
Amburgey, 1991). They did not find any support for the hypothesis that change in the 
environment affect the rate of strategic change, but they found a negative relationship 
between bureaucratic inertia and change in core activities and a positive one between 
bureaucratic inertia and change in the peripheral ones. Similar hypotheses were tested in 
a study of Finnish newspapers between  1771  and  1963  by Amburgey, Kelly and 
Barnett (1993).  In this  study,  they also found  support for  the  hypothesis  that 
environmental changes affect the rate of change, but the different operationalization of 
the main constructs makes both studies very difficult to compare. 
It is interesting that both of the above studies typically define strategic change as the 
transformation of a 'generalist' towards a 'specialist' organization. These questions are 
directly related to the wide stream in the strategic management literature which examines 
the reciprocal question about the motivations to 'diversify' (or to generalize). Ecological 
studies on strategic change and strategic management studies on diversification differ 
mainly on the methodological dimension: Whereas the former approach studies the 
hypothesis in a longitudinal framework that includes the 'population' of organizations, 
most strategic diversification studies have been cross-sectional and only include a 
sample of large organizations (which they hypothesize as being representative for the 
whole industry). However, spill-overs start to emerge. Hill and Hansen (1991) stressed 
the importance of longitudinal  research in  studies of diversification  within  the 
boundaries of one industry (or population). They have found in a study of the US 
Pharmaceutical industry between 1977-1986 that avoiding the uncertainty of investing 
--16--in risky projects (which is related to what organizational ecologists call bureaucratic 
inertia) is the main causal factor behind the decision to diversify (or to become more 
generalized as an organization). 
This important finding is at first sight contradictory with the organizational ecology 
one which stresses the negative influence of bureaucratic inertia on strategic change or 
diversification. However, organizational ecologists assume that the null hypothesis is 
no change at all. It seems acceptable that in certain populations change becomes so 
institutionalized that (e.g. through processes of mimetic isomorphism, Haveman 1993a) 
the null hypothesis is not valuable anymore and there has to be formulated a naive 
hypothesis such as the choice which involves the least risk (in this case diversification). 
Organizational ecology in turn may be able to translate this question to the whole 
population of organizations: in other words, is this hypothesis also valid for small 
organizations? 
In addition to the social argument of bureaucratic inertia, organizational ecology can 
also benefit from incorporating arguments formulated by the different rational choice 
theories developed in the strategic management literature. Resource based theories of 
the firm  stress the importance of an  excess in resources as  a reason  to  diversify 
(Penrose, 1959). For instance, in a longitudinal case study on the history of one firm, 
Baker (1992) has shown how changes in both the capital market and the number of 
MBA's mainly have affected the reasons to diversify and to divest. Since the capital 
markets in many populations form a dimension of what organizational ecologists call 
the carrying capacity of that particular population, including these variables in a model 
would allow to model changes in that carrying capacity as suggested by Brittain (1994). 
Of course, to do so, we have to assume that these changes are exogenous to the model 
(we will discuss this caveat later on in this paper). 
As discussed in the previous paragraphs, organizational ecology shows also some 
similarities with the theory on strategic grouping. We refer to the previous discussion 
on the formation of niches and the impact of multi-point and single-point competition 
(Carroll, 1991). 
Of course, in order to intensify the link between strategic management theory, 
organizational ecologists have to adjust their theory to larger organizations. Unlike 
small organizations, large ones have different levels of operation: there is the parent, the 
subsidiary, the division. Moreover, each of these operational units probably has a 
different date of founding.  Small organizations die, but large organizations 'divest'. 
Small organizations are founded, but large organizations 'expand' or 'diversify'. While 
--17--foundings  and failings  belong  to  the  domain  of the  organizational  ecologists, 
diversification and divestment (either through merger, acquisition or simply dissolution) 
are the domain of the strategic management scholar. 
Mitchell's study on the American medical sector product market between the 1950s 
and the 1980s (Mitchell, 1993 ; 1994) is one of the first empirical efforts which further 
distinguishes between these different categories of entry and exit. Following Shary 
(1992), he shows that age, size and density have very different effects on the founding 
rates of small organizations versus the entry rates of diversifying established firms. 
Furtheron, the relationship between these variables with failure rates is shown to be 
very different from their impact on rates of divestiture. 
More work is  needed in organizational ecology to  distinguish between these 
different entry and exit categories. However, industrial economists also turned their 
attention to this aspect (e.g. Shary, 1992; Dunne, Roberts and Samuelson, 1988). The 
link between industrial economics and economic theory in general with organizational 
ecology is the subject of the next paragraph. 
Organizational Ecology and the Renewed interest in Industrial Organization Jor 
Dynamic Studies oj Industry Evolution 
Over the past decade, industrial economists have increasingly renewed their interest 
in longitudinal (dynamic) studies of industrial evolution (Jovanovich, 1982; Klepper 
and Grady,  1990; Jovanovich and MacDonald,  1994; Evans,  1987; Dunne, Roberts 
and Samuelson,  1988).  In the models they developed, more and more attention is 
devoted to the competitive forces that determine the selection process in an evolving 
industry.  Much of the  debate  between  organizational  ecologists  and  industrial 
economists has been focused on which forces  create 'competition'. Organizational 
ecologists  typically argue that  competition directly  results  from  the  number of 
organizations in the population whereas industrial economists use  more complex 
models of competition in which larger organization may influence the intensity of 
competition. Both intellectual streams use competition as an explanation for failure, 
foundings and growth in an industry/population. 
In the density-dependence model, the intensity of competition depends simply on 
the number or density of organizations in a population. Although density might be a 
good  count of selective  pressures  in  biology,  in  economics,  differences  in 
organizational  size are  likely to alter the  pattern of selection.  Winter (1990:289) 
formulated two reasons why a mere count of numbers is  too weak to capture the 
--18--dynamics of competition: (1)  large firms  tend to  be 'a lot larger' than small firms 
(several studies report a lognormal distribution of sizes). This means that large firms 
have a disproportionate impact in shaping the environment of the population and (2) 
entry and exit patterns are concentrated in the smaller size categories (this hypothesis is 
strongly confirmed by the empirical studies of Dunne, Roberts and Samuelson, 1988 ; 
Pales and Ericson, 1990). 
Barnett and Amburgey (1990) introduced the concept of 'mass dependency' (see 
Figure 1,  part B)  to model the moderating effect of size on selection. The mass of a 
population is  defined as  the sum of the sizes of all organizations in this population. 
Selection may then result from two population dynamics: first, increases in the number 
of organizations (the density argument) affect the exit rates and second, also increases 
in the mass of these organizations, regardless whether this mass increase stems from 
the growth of one incumbent or from the entry of small organizations, can cause failure 
if the carrying capacity of the population is reached. In order to model the different 
impact that this mass variable has on the probability of failure of each individual 
organization, they operationalize mass at the organizational level as the total mass in the 
population minus the size of the focal organization at each of period of observation. 
Hence, mass has a smaller impact on relatively large organizations than on small ones. 
In a study on US telephone companies (see Table 5), Barnett and Amburgey (1990) 
have found that mass did not suppress the selective effect of density. They came to the 
conclusion that 'mass' both had a negative effect on failure rates and a positive one on 
founding rates.  In other words, large organizations decrease competition. Although 
these empirical results were unexpected in the organizational ecology framework, they 
are  very  consistent  with  Jovanovich's  economic  model  on  industry  selection 
(Jovanovich, 1982). Much has to do with the operationalization of the 'mass' variable 
and the selection of the industry or population. Barnett and Amburgey defined mass as 
the sum of sizes defined as the number of telephones sold. This mass variable is little 
more than the demand function used by economists (see also Winter, 1990). As shown 
by figure 4.2 in Barnett and Amburgey (1990:88), this demand function is increasing 
over most of the relevant period of observation. The question of founding can then be 
re-formulated as what fraction of the increase in output (to match demand) is due to 
output changes by incumbent firms as opposed to changes -- through entry and exit --
in the number of firms. Jovanovich (p. 654) then predicts that, if price is constant over 
time and if incumbents choose to produce less on average in the next period due to 
expected decreases in efficiency2,  then increases in demand should be met by new 
2see Jovanovich (1982:652) for a formal  description of the conditions under which this  happens. 
--19--entrants  (these  two  conditions  are  very  likely  to  be  met  if no  technological 
breakthroughs take place which affect both expected efficiency and price and if the 
industry is not subject to ever increasing returns to scale). In the particular case of ever 
increasing returns to scale (or natural monopolies), Baumol, Panzar and Willig's (1982) 
contestable market theory might be applied. Consistent with Jovanovich (1982), this 
theory predicts that large increases in demand are likely to be met by new entrants in the 
industry which occupy (temporarily) contestable niches. 
Also the negative impact of mass on failure rates can be explained by an economic 
model. Jovanovich (1982) basically presents a learning model in which organizations 
'learn' their distinctive capabilities gradually during their stay in the industry. The more 
a particular number of companies 'learns' that they are more efficient, on average, the 
more they will increase their output and the larger they will be. As a result, the less 
efficient ones will exit early in the industry life cycle and concentration will occur when 
the industry matures. This means  that there will  be lesser exits if mass increases. 
Because the economic models are derived from analytic reasoning which has predictive 
power under certain assumptions whereas the population ecology theories are basically 
post hoc explanations for empirical findings, it is unclear if populations ecology really 
can add value in this case. 
As shown in the previous paragraphs, competition is not only embodied in the 
foundings and disbandings, but also in the growth of individual companies. Studies of 
growth in economics have a long history, at least going back to Kapteyn's (1903) 
statements that growth is  proportional to size and  the factor of proportionality is 
random. In 1931, Gibrat argued that the size distribution of firms should be lognormal 
because of Kapteyn's growth process, better known as Gibrat's law. An extensive 
literature has tested Gibrat's law with mixed success (see Hannan and Ranger-Moore 
(1990) for an overview). As argued by Evans (1987), studies based on data for the late 
1940s and 1950s typically find a positive relationship between size and growth (in other 
words, large organizations grow more than small ones), while studies based on data 
after the sixties typically show a negative relationship between size and growth. 
Hannan and Ranger-Moore (1990) and Hannan, Ranger-Moore and Banaszak-Holl 
(1990) introduced a number of population ecology concepts in these models of growth. 
First, they have used the concept of carrying capacity to place an 'upper limit' on the 
growth of a  population  given a  set of social,  political and economic conditions 
(economists typically did not use such an upper limit). In this model, the growth of 
each organization depends on the sizes of all others (in the limit, when a population 
reaches the maximum carrying capacity, growth of one organization only goes at the 
--20--expense of other organizations). As a result, carrying capacity causes a decline in mean 
size, when the size of the largest organization grows (for a formal description of the 
model, see Hannan, Ranger-Moore and Banaszak-Holi. 1990: 251). 
In a next step, Hannan et al.  included entries and exits in the model. Entries were 
modelled as a constant rate Poisson process which resembles the model used by Simon 
and Bonini (1958).  Furtheron, they modelled a mortality process that reflects the 
'liability of newness'  and  the 'liability of smallness'  hypotheses  which  we have 
discussed above. 
Interestingly, the results of their simulations suggest that the combination of the 
entry process, the mortality process and the concept of carrying capacity produces a 
mixture or a (split) distribution. Among other results, they report that (Hannan et al., 
1990:253): 
' .. .The region to the left contains a subdistribution of new and recent entrants whose 
size distribution is essential lognormal. To the right there are a small number of 
older, larger organizations. As long as  the flow of entrants continues unabated, the 
two subdistributions persist. The combined distribution is far from lognormal  .. .' 
In a second simulation, they relax "Gibrat's Law" which holds that growth rates are 
statistically independent of size to introduce growth rates that decline with size (still 
assuming a constant variance of the growth rate). The results are very different. The 
relaxation  of Gibrat's  Law  produces  a  size  distribution of firms  which  is  not 
(statistically)  distinguishable from  a  lognormal,  but which  shows  an  extreme 
concentration of the distribution. In other words, a large bunch of organizations has 
similar sizes. This is where organizational ecology again comes into the picture. 
As discussed above, resource partitioning theory suggests that organizations in the 
'middle of the size distribution' compete most intensely. They compete for resources 
both with the 'large' organizations and with the 'smali' organizations. However, if this 
is true, this would result in a distribution with a center that is sparse, relative to the 
lognormal. The explanation of this result would lie in the concept of size-localized 
competition, which we have described in the previous paragraphs. When introducing 
size-localized competition (limited to discrete size windows), Hannan et al. (1990) find 
that the model with entries,  mortality and carrying capacity indeed produces the 
expected results (at least under the assumption that Gibrat's Law holds). When relaxing 
Gibrat's Law to include rates of growth that decline with size, the model produces two 
isolated subpopulations, characterized by mean sizes that are lower than the ones expect 
--21--under the lognormal distribution and with many  more organizations in the global 
population than initially expected. 
Building on these exploratory results, two empirical studies (the methodology of 
which we will discuss into greater detail in the empirical section of this paper) have 
analyzed the relation between location in the distribution, density dependence and 
growth rates. The first one analyzes Day Care Centers in Metropolitan Toronto between 
1971 and 1989 (Baum and Mezias, 1993) and the second one analyzes Credit Unions in 
New York City between 1914 and 1990 (Barron, West and Hannan, 1994). Baum and 
Mezias (1993) found a significant relationship between size-localized density (in a 
discrete size window) and growth rates.  Barron et al.  (1994) did not look at size-
localized density but tested  the  global  density dependent model.  They found  an 
inverted-U shaped relationship between density and growth (but these results may be 
affected by a sample selection bias, see empirical section). They also found support for 
a relaxation of Gibrat's Law towards rates of growth that decrease with the size of 
organizations. See Table 5, for an overview. 
Of course, although the empirical techniques (which will be discussed in detail in 
Part II of this paper) tend to converge between organizational ecologists and industrial 
economists, one can ask what the theoretical contribution is of organizational ecology to 
the  theory  of industrial  organization.  As  shown  in  the  previous  paragraphs, 
organizational ecology seems little to add in our understanding of the competitive 
process embodied in foundings and disbandings and the only concept it adds to the 
studies of growth is the upper limit of growth, namely the carrying capacity of a 
population. Liability of newness and liability of size are post-hoc explanations for an 
empirical finding, which economists have modelled in a much more profound way (see 
e.g. the learning model of Jovanovich, 1982). Hence, can organizational ecology give 
some new insights? 
Much of the controversy between both streams arises from  the fact that both 
explanations are seen as substitutes to each other. However, we argue that much more 
can be gained if they are considered complements. Economists have a long tradition of 
studying existing industries, where demand is the central concept. Price competition, 
selection, etc all result from matching supply to demand. Operationalizing the concept 
of carrying capacity to industries or populations which are so demand driven (e.g. 
telephone industry) seems to  add little value.  Not an abstract concept of carrying 
capacity limits the growth of an organization, but demand does. Indeed, the empirical 
operationalization of 'mass' in Barnett and Amburgey's paper (1990) simply reflects 
demand. In its essence, demand is just what makes an organization independent from 
--22--its  'resource  environment'.  Demand  generates  cash  flow,  which  enables  the 
organization or industry to influence its carrying capacity and to make it endogenous to 
the growth of the industry itself. 
But not every industry or population has such a well-defined demand, nor does 
demand have an equal impact during the entire life cycle of the industry or population. It 
is exactly there, where demand and hence neo-classic economics fails to explain the 
selection process, that organizational ecology can make its largest contribution. First, 
some populations can be classified as 'non-commercial' such as the Labor Unions or 
Day Care Centers. In these populations, demand always plays a lesser role and neo-
classic economics has little to say. Not surprisingly, the density dependence model has 
received most support in exactly those idiosyncratic populations. 
Second, there are the populations or industries which are demand-driven during 
certain periods in their life cycle but not always. Most industries represent this category. 
Let us take the biopharmaceutical industry as an example. Economists will define the 
biopharmaceutical industry as those companies that sell biopharmaceutical products. 
Only revenues from product sales are taken into account and it is assumed that the total 
demand is sufficient to sustain the industry. However, more than a decade had passed 
after the founding of the first biotech start-up (Genentech,  1971) before the first 
biopharmaceutical product was sold on the US market (human insulin by Eli Lilly in 
1982), another five years or so had passed before the first biotech start-ups started to 
sell a biopharmaceutical product (Genentech started to sell Protropin in 1986) and even 
in 1995 no more than 20 companies sell biopharmaceutical products and it may take 
another decade before product revenues are sufficient to sustain this industry. During 
those 25 years however, about 500 companies (both small biotech ones and large 
pharmaceutical ones) are estimated to be or have been active in biopharmaceuticals (see 
e.g. Ernst & Young, 1995). It  is exactly during this period of the industry life cycle that 
the density dependence model can contribute most in explaining failure and success. 
Economic models can in tum gain from the density dependence findings to correct their 
sample selection problem which results from the fact that they treat this early period as 
non-existent. Although rather recent economic studies such as Evans (1987) and Hall 
(1987) have started to correct for sample selection bias due to failure in their models of 
growth, no one has ever corrected for this bias due to failure before industry entry (this 
means before a company ever sells a product, we refer to the empirical part of this paper 
for the technical details on sample selection bias). 
But not only in the beginning of the industry life cycle, also at the end of the life 
cycle demand decreases in importance. In industries, which reach maturity, there is 
--23--often a need to  're-legitimate' the industry. Both the brewery sector and generic 
pharmaceuticals are examples of such industries. In the brewery sector, a couple of 
large powerful breweries try to 'promote' the use of beer in order to increase aggregate 
demand. In doing so, they create externalities for local microbreweries that can only 
exist if the larger breweries spend money on generic advertising.  In  the generic 
pharmaceutical sector, the same thing happens. If an ethic pharmaceutical drug comes 
off-patent, then a small number of generic manufacturers promote this generic product 
and a large number of small local generic ones benefit from this generic advertising. But 
also the large companies need the small ones in this case. The small companies procure 
that the supply of the product is sufficient enough so that the generic advertising is 
effective. For instance, the large generic houses may only be interested to supply the 
product to the large warehouses for which they have a distribution network, but the 
small manufacturers can also sell the product to local pharmacies. A physician will only 
prescribe the product if he is certain that it will be sold in each pharmacy. The neo-
classic economic models which use price competition as the driving force behind 
industrial  evolution have  much  difficulty in  explaining  this  mutualism.  On the 
organizational ecology side however, resource partitioning theory exactly describes this 
mutualism between large and small firms. 
We have found only one recent empirical organizational ecology study which more 
or less goes in the direction of such a life cycle hypothesis, namely Baum, Korn and 
Kotha's (1995)  analysis of the Telecommunications Services industry.  The main 
hypothesis in this study is derived from Utterback and Suarez's (1993) finding that pre-
dominant design organizations increase their market power once a dominant design is 
established and therefore deter entry and increase failure rates among the cohort of new 
post-dominant design  entrants.  During  the  period  before a  dominant  design is 
established, it is known that product sales are not sufficient to sustain the industry. A 
lot of organizations during this  period do  not even have sales (although they are 
members of the population). Baum, Kom and Kotha (1995) have found that the density 
of the cohort of organizations that were active in the industry before the dominant 
design was established, affected the number companies that entered the industry after 
this dominant design (see Table 5 for a summary). 
Finally, also Haveman's (1993b)  study on the  Loan and Savings  Industry is 
noteworthy in this respect. This study contrasts the theory of bureaucratic inertia which 
was developed by Hannan and Freeman (1984) with the economic and  institutional 
theory of market power. Although not explicitly modelling the life cycle hypothesis 
discussed above, Haveman (1993b) is interested in the entry decision of Californian 
Loan and Savings companies in  non-traditional  markets.  In this sense,  the study 
--24--analyzes the decision to invest in a market where no demand is available yet. First, 
theories of bureaucratic inertia predict that large organizations will be very reluctant to 
make changes (the rigidity of size hypothesis) while theories of market power predict 
that larger organizations will both have more incentives to introduce change in order to 
sustain their market power and more slack resources which they can use to generate 
change3  (the  fluidity  of size  hypothesis).  Haveman  suggests  that  these  two 
contradicting powers will generate an inverted-U shaped relationship between size and 
change. 
Yrhis seemingly contradiction has been investigated in  the  narrower context of technological innovations 
by  Henderson (1993). 
--25--PART II:  EMPIRICAL METHODS AND  VARIABLE MEASUREMENT 
Organizational ecologists have developed a wide range of models to test their 
hypotheses. It would be impossible to give an exhaustive overview of all variations of 
models which have been used in their studies. Almost each new empirical study uses 
another variation.  Instead, we will discuss the three "baseline" models which most 
studies depart from.  These models  can  be  classified according to  the dependent 
variable, which is analyzed, namely organizational failures, organizational foundings or 
a continuous variable such as organizational growth. We will discuss in this part how 
these models have been refined and adapted to certain contexts. In addition to this, we 
will  analyze whether and how organizational ecologists have dealt with statistical 
problems such as specification errors or unobserved heterogeneity, sample selection 
bias, serial correlation and heteroskedasticity. Special attention will be given to how 
organizational ecologists have gradually adapted econometric techniques developed for 
longitudinal data analysis (e.g. fixed and random effects models) as a supplement to the 
classic event history models. 
Furthermore, in the theoretical part we have introduced a number of theoretical 
concepts such as liability of smallness and newness, size-localized competition, overlap 
density, etc  ... and we have explained their theoretic rationale. In this part, we will show 
how  these  concepts are operationalized and  measured in  a  number of different 
populations. We will discuss the strengths and weaknesses of these operationalizations. 
The remainder of this empirical part is organized as follows: In a first section, we 
will discuss the stream of research which has focused on mortality or exit as  the 
dependent variable. We will consecutively focus on the baseline empirical model, the 
extensions to this model, the problems associated with the model and the introduction 
of new explanatory variables. Next, we will analyze studies of organizational foundings 
in the same way as the previous studies of mortality. Finally, we tum to the studies of 
growth and change which use a continuous dependent variable. Again, we will use the 
same sequence of analysis. 
II. I. ORGANIZATIONAL ECOLOGY STUDIES OF MORTALITY 
II.l.l. DISCUSSION OF THE BASELINE HAZARD MODEL 
Nearly all studies of organizational mortality use the instantaneous rate of failure4 as 
the fundamental dependent variable. This continuous hazard rate  h(t)  can be defined as 
follows: 
4In other words, a hazard rate measured in a continuous time interval. 
--26--prob(t,t+M) 
h't) =  lim 
I  ilt->O  ilt 
( 1) 
where  prob(t,t+ilt)is the probability of failure in the interval (t,t+fit)  given that the 
organization was still alive at time t. Depending on the shape of the hazard rate function 
he!) , a number of different variations is used. One of the simplest (and most frequently 
used models) sets the hazard rate function h(t) equal  to a log linear functionS of the 
explanatory variables, while holding it constant over time. The following specification 
can then be used to estimate the hazard rate: 
h(t) = exp[bX(t)]  (2) 
where h(!)  is the instantaneous rate of failure, X(t) is a vector of the covariates at time t 
and b is the vector of coefficient estimates. It is clear that under this specification, the 
hazard rate is assumed to be constant over time. Two other frequently used models are 
the Weibull (log of the hazard is allowed to increase/decrease linearly with time) and the 
Gompertz (log of the hazard is allowed to increase/decrease linearly with the log of 
time). Because of the linearity between the hazard and the time/log time variable, the 
Weibull, Gompertz and Exponential model are called 'proportional hazard' models. 
Besides these parametric models,  there are two other 'families' of models used in 
organizational ecology studies: a first one is the semiparametric model, called Cox's 
proportional hazard model which allows any function between the hazard rate and time; 
a  second family includes  the accelerated time failure  models  which allow other 
distributions such as the lognormal, the gamma and the loglogistic. Allison (1984) 
gives an excellent introduction to each of these models, while Hannan and Tuma (1984) 
give a more detailed description. The empirical studies on failure data show that the 
relationship between time and the hazard rate is very dependent upon the population of 
study. Table 6 gives an overview of the models chosen in a selection of recent studies. 
- INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE-
Most of the more recent studies use a multiple-spells formulation of the model to 
permit the incorporation of time variation in the co-variates. In this formulation, the 
event history of the organization is broken down into yearly (or monthly) observations 
in which the organization is at risk of failure. Like in any other pooled data set, the level 
of analysis is then the 'spell' (every observation-period) rather than the organization 
5rhe relationship is set loglineair to avoid that the hazard rate takes values which are less than o. 
--27--itself. As long as the organization did not exit, each of these spells is treated as right 
censored. 
The parametric models are then estimated using maximum likelihood estimation. 
Maximum likelihood combines the censored and uncensored data in such a way that the 
estimates  are asymptotically  unbiased,  normally  distributed  and  efficient  (see 
Kalbfleisch and Prentice, 1980 for a more detailed analysis). In order to estimate the 
semi-parametric one, Cox has  developed a partial  likelihood estimator which has 
excellent large sample properties (see Allison, 1984 for a review). 
I  t should be noted here that the hazard models do not have a random disturbance 
term. Still, these models are not deterministic because there is random variation in the 
relationship between the unobservable dependent variable h(t)  and the observed length 
of the time interval. However, the absence of the random disturbance term remains 
controversial and brings  us  back to  one of the major weaknesses in the density 
dependence models of mortality, namely 'unobserved heterogeneity'. 
As discussed in the theoretical part of this paper, the density dependence  model 
predicts a U-shaped relationship between organizational density and mortality rates. It  is 
especially the first part of this U-shape, the decrease in mortality through the process of 
legitimation, that is the subject of criticism. Petersen and Koput (1991) have shown that 
even if the 'real' mortality rate is constant over time for each organization, unobserved 
differences in organizations tend to produce a decrease in the mortality rates. The 
intuition behind this finding is straightforward: organizations with high hazard rates 
drop out of the population very early and are then eliminated from the risk set. This 
process yields risk sets that contain individuals with predominantly lower risks until 
population density becomes so high (through free entry and lower exit) that the hazard 
rate starts increasing again. There are three ways to deal with this problem. (1) One can 
create a  random disturbance  term  which  captures  the  unobserved heterogeneity. 
Heckman and Singer (1982)  have introduced an extended Weibull  model which 
includes a random error term. Early findings have shown that the coefficients in this 
model are very sensitive to the distribution choice for the random error term (Allison, 
1984:33).  Hence, the usefulness of this  model  has  to  be  proved yet.  (2)  One can 
introduce more explanatory variables in the model. As discussed in the theoretical part, 
organizational ecologists have included organizational-level variables such as size and 
age to control for this heterogeneity problem. One can also think of other variables such 
as  access  to  resources as important additional  covariates.  (3)  One  can  start  to 
disaggregate the density variables based on the observed variables. The conceptual 
models behind solution (2) and (3) have been discussed in the theoretical part, but the 
--28--operationalization of some of the most important variables receives some further 
attention in the next paragraph. 
II.l.2. DISAGGREGATION OF TIIE DENSITY VARIABLE 
As discussed in the theoretical part of this paper, density has been disaggregated 
along a number of dimensions. A first dimension was the geographic location. In their 
study on Bavarian Breweries, Swaminathan and Wiedenmayer (1991) assume that the 
density variable may behave different at lower levels of analysis than at the higher ones. 
They introduce three levels: the national, the state and the city level. The hypothesis is 
as follows:  the lower the level, the more different subpopulations and the higher the 
impact of the density variable at the subpopulation level on organizational failure rates. 
Although appealingly simple, this kind of disaggregation has a major limitation: the 
concept can only be applied to those populations where geographic locations play an 
important role in terms of competition (e.g. in the case of hotels or restaurants for 
which the demand is mainly local). Swaminathan and Wiedenmayer found empirical 
support for this disaggregation at the state level but not at the city level (see Table 6 for 
a summary). 
In a  very  appealing  study,  Baum  and Singh  (1994)  have  used  the  demand 
dimension to disaggregate the density variable. In their study on Toronto Day Care 
Centers, they have split up the population in different niches based on the age category 
of children they were licensed to accept. By using the demand side as a criterion for 
niche formation, they make a first link with the extensive literature on strategic group 
formation (see McGee and Thomas, 1986 ; Thomas and Venkatraman,  1988 for a 
review).  Because some organizations compete in more than one niche, a  simple 
disaggregated measure of density at the niche level is not sufficient. To address this 
problem, Baum and Singh (1994) introduce the concept of overlap density (1994:352) 
and nonoverlap density (1994:353). 
(3) 
where Nit is the number of organizations in organizational niche i  at time t , Njt is the 
number  of  organizations  in  organizational  niche  j  at time t  and Wij  is the 
organizational niche overlap weight of organizational niche i with organizational niche j. 
wij  lies always in the {O,l} interval with Wij  = °  when there is  no  potential for 
competition and wij  = 1 when organizations occupy the same niche. Wij  is then 
--29--measured as the ratio of overlap between i andj and the width of niche i . The width of 
the niche is then a function of the part of the demand served by that niche (for instance 
0-3 year, i.e. 36 months in the case of daycare centers) and the overlap consists of that 
part of the demand that is served by both niches (e.g. another niche serves the 3-6 year 
ones, but there can be a 6 month overlap). It should be noted here that the concept of 
niche overlap can also be used in those studies that disaggregate the density variable 
along the geographic dimension. 
Nonoverlap density is  exactly the reverse of overlap density and can easily be 
defined in the following way: 
(4) 
The concept of niche overlap and niche nonoverlap has some similarities with the 
concept of strategic groups and market segmentation in the strategic management 
literature. Still, both approaches remain very different in the way they identify groups 
of competitors. The strategic management literature typically groups organizations along 
a number of dimensions which represent the outcomes of strategic actions (e.g. age, 
products, employees) whereas the ecology literature tends to define niche based on the 
resources with which organizations enter the strategic battle. Hence, overlap density 
does  not capture actual  or realized competition but focuses  on the potential  for 
competition. 
Both disaggregation along the geographic and demand dimension solely operate at 
the niche or subpopulation level of analysis. In fact, little or no data is needed at the 
organizational level. Hannan, Ranger-Moore and Banaszak-Holl (1990) disaggregated 
the  density  variable  even  further  to  the  organizational  level  of analysis  and 
operationalized it as size-localized competition. 
Organizational ecology suggests that organizations of different sizes typically 
employ  very  different strategies and  structures  and  therefore draw  on different 
resources. For instance, large organizations may have a very generalist strategy, while 
small  organizations have a  specialist niche-oriented  strategy.  These  unobserved 
differences  in  strategy  may  affect the  failure  rates  of the  different  groups  of 
organizations. In order to deal with this kind of 'unobserved heterogeneity', Hannan, 
Ranger-Moore and Banaszak-Holl (1990:256)  have introduced the concept of 'size-
localized competition' (see also the theoretical  part of this paper).  Size-localized 
--30--competition assumes that organizations compete most intensely with organizations of 
the same size.  Hence, competition between pairs of organizations is a  decreasing 
function of differences in their respective sizes. One way to model this variable in a 
continuous way is to use the Euclidean distance of each organization from all others in 
terms of size. However, one can argue that organizations only compete with each other 
when they belong to a certain "size window". For instance, the largest organization in 
the industry is very unlikely to compete with the smallest one if the difference in sizes is 
very large. Therefore, size localized competition has been computed in a number studies 
(see Table 6, for an overview), using equation 5: 
(5) 
where m is  the width of the window, i stands for the i-th organization,j for the j-th 
organization, t for the time period and s for the size of the organization. The boundaries 
of the size-windows are arbitrarily determined as a function of the absolute size of a 
particular organization. Most often m is set equal to sitl2. 
Variations on this size-localized competition variable have been proposed in Baum 
and Mezias (1992).  They have substituted the size variable by an 'average price' 
variable to capture price-localized competition and a physical distance variable to capture 
geographic-localized competition between hotels in Manhattan. See also Table 6. 
11.1.3. FURTIIER CATEGORIZATION OF 1HE DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
As shown in Table 6, most ecological studies spend very little attention to the 
definition of 'failures'. However, in an industrial context, 'failure' or 'exit' is not 
always straightforward to define. But not only the ecology literature suffers from this 
weakness, Shary (1991) criticized the industrial economic studies exactly for the fact 
that they treated 'exit' as a homogenous category. She introduced a theoretical model 
which  distinguishes  between  three  different kinds  of exits,  namely  voluntary 
liquidation, involuntary bankruptcy and merger.  From an  empirical point of view 
however, it is  very difficult to get data which clearly show the distinction between 
'voluntary liquidation' or 'involuntary bankruptcy'. In a very appealing study, Mitchell 
(1994) analyzed the difference between 'dissolution' and 'divestiture' rates, both for 
start-up firms and subsidiaries of existing companies. Interestingly, his study is among 
the  first  to  make a  distinction  between  'business units'  and  'parent firms'.  He 
--31--operationalized divestiture as the 'event' that a business unit is acquired by another firm 
or that it is sold to another firm.  He modelled 'dissolutions' and 'divestitures' as 
competing risks in the baseline hazard model. In other words, in the hazard model of 
divestitures, dissolutions are treated as right-censored observations while in the model 
of dissolutions, divestitures are right-censored. Technically, this means that dissolution 
and divestiture are statistically unrelated to each other (which might be too stringent 
from a conceptual point of view). Among other results, the study shows that age has a 
positive effect on divestiture rates of subsidiaries  and  start-up firms,  even after 
controlling for size, while the age variable had a negative effect on dissolution rates for 
start-up firms (for an oversight, see Table 6). This means that in future studies it will be 
increasingly important to make a distinction between different kinds of exits. 
11.2. ORGANIZATIONAL ECOLOGY STUDIES OF FOUNDING 
Organizational ecologists have traditionally produced many more empirical studies 
of mortality rates than of founding or entry rates. One of the main reasons for this lack 
of attention lies in the fact that the density dependence model provides a very weak 
guidance to describe structural characteristics within a population (or a market) beyond 
the mere count of numbers. Exactly those 'market characteristics' have been the focus 
of attention in most economic studies of entry such as Baumol, Panzar and Willig's 
(1982) study of 'hit and run' entry by start-up firms in contestable niches and Caves 
and  Porter's (1977)  study on entry by established firms  in oligopolistic  market 
segments. 
Recently, the study on entries and foundings has taken two new directions: First, at 
the market or population level of analysis, the disaggregation of the density dependence 
variable has  raised  new  questions about entry or founding  in different niches or 
subpopulations. Second, splitting the entry variable up into foundings of start-up firms 
and entry decisions of firms that are already active in another market has created the 
possibility to analyze the entry decision at an organizational level (for existing firms) 
and to include idiosyncratic variables for each of the entering firms. In the latter case, 
the baseline model is exactly the hazard model as discussed in the previous section. In 
the former  however,  organizational  ecologists  tend  to  make use of a Poisson or 
Negative Binomial Model which will be discussed below. Table 7 gives a selected 
overview of the most recent studies of organizational entry or founding and the models 
used in these studies. 
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--32--11.2.1. MODELS USED TO ANALYZE PROCESSES OF ORGANIZATIONAL FOUNDING 
There are several caveats in the definition of organizational foundings. One of these 
is the estimation of the exact time when a founding takes place. If  one uses the hazard 
model (or a related accelerated failure time model) to model the process of foundings, 
then one assumes that the time between two founding dates is the dependent variable of 
interest. In other words, one defines a founding as a discrete event which takes place at 
a well-known, well-defined point of time. Of course, both from a conceptual and an 
empirical point of view, this assumption is very difficult to hold. Which date is "the" 
date? The founding of an organizations seems to be more of a process than of an exact 
event. Hence, it makes more sense to estimate the number of organizational foundings 
that are expected to occur within a certain time interval, than to model the exact date. 
As shown by Barnett and Amburgey (1990), a Poisson process then provides a 
natural baseline model for organizational founding. The basic Poisson model for event 
count data can be described as in equation 6: 
(6) 
The Poisson model holds the strong assumption that both the variance and the mean 
P  r(Yt = Y  t  )  of the number of events are equal. This assumption is often found to be too 
stringent in an analysis of founding rates (see Ranger-Moore et aI., 1991). Unobserved 
heterogeneity in the model always leads to overdispersion. A first way to correct for 
this heterogeneity would be to adopt a 'fixed effects approach' by including dummy 
variables which are niche-specific (e.g. a dummy variable for each of the different 
geographic locations or market niches). The fixed effects approach is very attractive 
when no real conceptual model is available which explains the distribution of the 
heterogeneity. However, the main disadvantages of these models are (1) they absorb a 
lot degrees of freedom (one for each dummy variable) and (2) parameters of the time-
invariant covariates, if any, contaminate with the dummy variables and are therefore 
very difficult to estimate.  Hausman,  Hall and Griliches (1984)  have proposed to 
overcome these  problems  by  letting A vary randomly across  individual  units.  A 
common way to do sois by including equation 7 in equation 6 (the Poisson model), or 
if overdispersion is a problem, by incorporating equation 7 in the negative binomial 
specification which can be derived from the baseline model (see Hausman, Hall and 
Grilliches, 1984:921): 
--33--where the error tenn  I> i t is assumed to follow a gamma distribution, i can be the number 
of different niches or populations and t is the time variable. Of course, the value of this 
random effects largely depends on the  assumption  that the errors really follow a 
gamma-like distribution, or in other words, that the errors will be larger for larger of Ait 
(in this case the number of foundings/niche/period of time). 
In a very recent study on founding rates,  Lomi  (1995)  has  estimated a  semi-
parametric random effects Poisson model, which was initially presented by Brannas 
and  Rosenqvist  (1994).  In this  model,  the error term  is  not assumed to follow a 
particular distribution, but falls in a number of k discrete classes (or support points) and 
can therefore be represented by Ek.  An iterative procedure adds classes or points until 
the inclusion of an additional class or point does not significantly improve the likelihocxl 
of the model anymore. For each model the number of classes will be different. 
It should be noted that the event count models are used to estimate the impact of 
variables at population (market) or subpopulation (market segment) level of analysis. 
This level of analysis is the only one possible, when analyzing founding dates of start-
ups (no information is  available on this organization before its start-up). However, 
when analyzing the foundings of new business units by existing companies or entry of 
these firms in new markets, organization level information is available. Then, not event 
count models are the logic choice, but a probit, logit or simple hazard model (the latter 
under the assumption that the exact times of entry or founding are known). 
11.2.2. DISAGGREGATIONOFTIIE DENSITY V  ARIABLEAND UNOBSERVED 
HETEROGENEITY IN STUDIES OF FOUNDING 
The disaggregation of the density variable based into market niches and geographic 
segments has also been applied to studies of organizational founding by Baum and 
Singh (1994, market niches) and Lomi (1995, geographic niches). Baum and Singh 
were especially interested in the effects of overlap and non-overlap density on founding 
rates, but did not control for unobserved heterogeneity between the different niches 
(their random effects model only controls for unobserved heterogeneity on the time 
dimension). A summary of both studies is given in Table 7. 
Following Aldrich and Fiol (1994), Debackere, Clarysse and Manigart (1995) have 
expanded the density dependence model  to  analyze not only the influence of the 
competitive structure of a population (represented by the density variable) on founding 
rates, but also the effect of the social structure of that population. Using social network 
--34--analysis, they model the contacts between research groups in transgene plants and the 
exchange relations between venture capital organizations in the Dutch venture capital 
industry.  Among other results,  they find that the  more incumbents belong to an 
industry-wide network, the  lesser foundings  occur, but on the other hand a high 
concentration of network prestige among a few top organizations increases founding 
rates again. 
Since no information is available for start-up firms at the organizational level, one 
can only adopt a market or niche perspective as the appropriate level of analysis. In 
order to analyse organization-level effects, some recent studies have specifically 
eliminated  those  start-up foundings  from  their sample  and looked at entries by 
companies that were already active in another market. Haveman (1993) modelled the 
processes of mimetic isomorphism by looking whether large firms were attracted to 
enter an emerging niche because similarly sized firms had already entered this niche. 
From a totally different perspective, Mitchell (1989) analyzed whether an incumbent is 
likely to enter a new subfield if its core products are threatened or if it possesses the 
complementary (specialized) assets to develop, manufacture or market the product in the 
new emerging subfield. 
11.3. ORGANIZATIONAL ECOLOGY STUDIES OF GROWTH AND CHANGE: 
FROM SURVIVAL MODELS BACK TO REGRESSION 
As described in the theoretical part, organizational ecologists have recently focused 
their attention on studies of growth and change. As long as these variables are defined 
as discrete steps (e.g. growth from a generalist towards a specialist organization as a 
discrete step point in time), the baseline hazard model as discussed in section 1 of this 
part can be used (e.g. Amburgey, Kelly and Barnett's study of Finnish newspapers, 
1993). However, if these variables are measured continuously, then fixed and random 
effect regression models are the most appropriate. The use of these techniques, requires 
additional caution with econometric problems such  as  serial  correlation,  sample 
selection biases and heteroskedasticity problems. Reviewing these techniques and their 
possible solutions is way beyond the scope of this paper. This section aims only to 
review briefly how careful these recent ecology studies have selected the models and 
corrected these errors, which traditionally were the playground of econometricians. A 
brief overview of the studies discussed in this section is presented in Table 8. 
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--35--Haveman (1993) introduced 'rate of change' as a continuous variable in her study 
of the California Savings and Loan Industry (in contrast to the previous studies which 
analyzed discrete steps of change).  Unobserved heterogeneity is assumed to be 
organization-specific, but no distribution is hypothesised for the error terms. Fixed 
effects are included in the model by subtracting the within regression means for each of 
the organizations (this way, one can avoid loosing too many degrees of freedom). Even 
after correction for these organization-specific effects, she finds heteroskedasticity of 
the errors (proportional to organization size), which she corrects using weighted least 
squares. One can raise the question here why no distribution could be defined for the 
error term which would solve for this whole problem in a random effects model. This 
preference for a random effects model is only re-enforced by the serial correlation 
where she corrects for by using pseudo-generalized least squares. The dataset in this 
study also shows a problem which has received increasing attention in economic 
studies, namely that of sample selection. The large amount of entry and exit in the 
population (see Haveman, 1993:23) may indicate that the population is biased towards 
the stronger organizations (for a good description of different kinds of sample selection 
problems and their solutions, we refer to Winship and Mare, 1992). 
Besides studies of strategic change, organizational ecologists have also started to 
study the processes of organizational growth, which have traditionally been studies by 
industrial economists (Evans,  1987~ Hall,  1987). We have identified the studies by 
Baum and Mezias (1993), Barron, West and Hannan (1994) and Barnett (1994) as 
recent empirical efforts by organizational ecologists to model growth. Following the 
extensive economic literature on growth, each of studies uses a power function as a 
baseline model. The reduced form of this function (which can be estimated by OLS) can 
then be written as in equation 8: 
10g(St)=bl  (log(St-1))+b 'Xt-l  (8) 
where St is the size of an organization in period t,  St-1 its size in period t-l and Xt-l 
vector of covariates for that in period t-l organization which are supposed to affect its 
size in t (e.g. the age of that organization, or its level of innovative efforts). Baum and 
Mezias  (1993: 140)  used a  least squares dummy variable version of fixed  effects 
models, because they did not have a clear idea of the distribution of errors due to 
unobserved heterogeneity (see Sayrs, 1989 for a review). For the same reason, Barron, 
West and Hannan (1994) and Barnett (1994) choose the fixed effects model. However, 
to avoid a large loss in degrees of freedom they subtract the within-organization mean 
from each observation. Baum and Mezias (1993) checked for heteroskedasticity, but 
--36--did not find any (which supports the assumption that the error term can be decomposed 
in an organization-specific intercept and a homoskedastic serially uncorrelated random 
disturbance term). Barnett (1994) however found autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity 
to be a problem an corrected for this by first order differentiation and weighted least 
squares respectively. Interestingly, both Barnett (1994) and Baum and Mezias (1993) 
have corrected for a sample selection bias which might have resulted from failure of 
those organizations that had lower growth rates6. 
By means of conclusion for this section, we can say that (1) there is an empirical 
and theoretical need to further investigate the distribution of the errors resulting from 
unobserved heterogeneity. As shown in the previous paragraphs, the fixed effects 
models  which are  used in most studies are not always sufficient to  correct for 
heteroskedasticity and serial correlation. And (2) although half of the studies discussed 
correct for sample selection bias, little attention is given to Mitchell's (1994) finding that 
organizations with different patterns of entry (or maybe even different patterns of exit) 
have different organizational life cycles. 
PART III: CONCLUSION  AND  SUGGESTIONS  FOR  FURTHER  RESEARCH 
As shown in the paper, population ecology and in its newer form, organizational 
ecology, has evolved from a collection of more or less unrelated theoretical concepts 
towards an  integrated theory of organizational failure and founding.  The density 
dependence model can be seen as the backbone of this theory.  Researchers of this 
density model have integrated other ecology concepts such a liability of newness and 
size, resource partitioning and niche formation in a very creative way to address the 
fundamental critic of unobserved heterogeneity and to look for alternative explanations 
of failure and founding. The result is a theory, which not only models the effects on the 
population level of analysis, but beyond these population dynamics also focuses on 
organizational differences and on niche characteristics at the mezzo-level of analysis. 
But additional theoretic explanations for failures and foundings should not always 
be found within the boundaries of organizational ecology itself. The closest related 
intellectual stream in this respect is institutional theory, which has since long been 
hypothesized  as  being  complementary  to  the  ecological  ideas  (Zucker,  1987). 
Institutional  theory  stresses,  among  other,  the  importance of the  institutional 
environment in explaining founding and failure. The majority of organizational ecology 
studies have included changes in the regulated environment as a control variable, but 
6rhis may result in  an over-estimation of the growth rates. In this case, the sample selection is biased 
towards the faster growing organizations. 
--37--very few explicitly modelled institutional embeddedness as an explanation. Only two 
studies really integrate institutional theory with organizational ecology: Baum and Oliver 
(1991)  explicitly investigated  linkages  to  the  regulated  environment as a  main 
explanation for mortality and Tucker, Singh and Meinhard (1990) modelled institutional 
change (in the regulated environment) as a determinant of organizational foundings. 
However, the institutional environment represents not only the regulated environment 
but also the network of inter-organizational relations which are developed along the life 
cycle of a population or industry. Even less empirical work has been done to model 
these linkages in the density dependence model. As far as we know, only one very 
recent study by Debackere, Clarysse and Manigart (1995) has investigated the effect of 
social structure on founding rates. But it is exactly the formation of this social structure 
which can have most potential in explaining differences in legitimacy building both at 
the industry (Aldrich and Fiol, 1994) and the organizational level. Social structures do 
not only modify competition, they also determine the potential for future competition. 
Future research, which incorporates this dimension in the density model, will be very 
promlsmg. 
Of course, although the use of institutional theory can enrich the density model, it 
does not really challenge its basic assumptions. On the contrary, the implementation of 
strategic management concepts and especially the integration with industrial economics 
can give organizational ecology a different face. Let us begin with strategic management 
theory. As shown in the paper, this stream of research includes at least two subdomains 
which have natural linkages to organizational ecology: the theory of differentiation and 
the literature on strategic groups. Recently, researchers on differentiation have argued 
that the real question of interest is not 'whether' organizations change strategically or 
not, but rather, if change is an institutionalized process in an industry, 'how' they 
change.  More specifically, Hill and Hansen (1991) have shown how the choice to 
differentiate in the context of the pharmaceutical industry, is driven by bureaucratic 
inertia and uncertainty avoidance. Since change is nowadays so institutionalized in this 
industry, managers can not motivate not to change anymore, but can choose to change 
in a conservative (differentiation) or in a more risky way (innovation). This has major 
implications for the density  dependence model  which  assumes  that bureaucratic 
organizations do not change at all. Future research should analyze what the effect is of 
altering this null hypothesis of no change towards a naive hypothesis of 'change with 
the least risks' . 
But the  theory  of  differentiation  has  also  another  major  implication  for 
organizational ecologists: differentiation can be seen as the way 'large organizations' 
enter new markets (Haveman, 1993a; Mitchell, 1994). The antipode of differentiation, 
--38--namely divestment, represents the way how large organizations exit. In other words, 
founding  and failure of large organizations is  much  more complex than initially 
presented  by  organizational  ecologists.  As  argued  in  the  previous  paragraph, 
differentiation or entry in new markets may be the result of a strategic decision which 
has very little to do with the legitimation or competitive structure of that market. But 
also the decision to 'divest' may be caused by totally different arguments than the 
competitive structure of that population. Therefore, much more work should be done in 
introducing the complexities of large organizations in the theory of organizational 
ecology. The pioneering efforts of Mitchell (1994) and Shary (1991) include additional 
guidelines for future research in this area. 
Furtheron, the disaggregation of the  density variable into different niches or 
subpopulations is clearly related to  one of the major weaknesses in  the theory of 
organizational ecology, namely the multi-dimensionality of the 'carrying capacity' 
concept. Although carrying capacity is the central argument in the density dependence 
model, it is  seldom explicitly mentioned or modelled in  empirical studies. So far, 
organizational ecologists have picked one dimension such as the geographic location on 
which they disaggregate the population into different niches or subpopulations  7. In 
doing so, they assume that this dimension is the only one along which the niches differ. 
It  is clear that this assumption is a very stringent one. Other dimensions such as market 
or new ones such as financial resources can introduce heterogeneity in the model if they 
are important for the carrying capacity of the population. Although the resource based 
niche concept has clear advantages over the strategic group concept which is being 
criticized for having lost each feeling with reality, organizational ecologists might 
benefit from the multi-dimensional approach developed by strategic group researchers. 
To do so, future research should pay much more attention to which dimensions are 
important both as sources of heterogeneity and as homogene elements of the carrying 
capacity in different populations. Related to this is the critique which organizational 
ecologists have received from economists (among others) that exactly those populations 
are studied in which 'carrying capacity' or the resource environment plays an important 
role (Winter, 1990). 
Indeed,  most of the studies discussed in this review comprise relatively small 
organizations such as hotels, Day Care Centers, Newspapers or Credit Unions. Baum 
and Mezias (1993: 132) for instance state in their introduction: 
7in this paper, we chose not to mention the community-population relation because, at a conceptual level, 
there is  no clear distinction between this relation and the population-niche one. 
--39--' ... From an ecological standpoint, DCCs provide an appropriate setting for the study 
of competitive processes because they exhibit a common dependence on the material 
and social environment. DCCs compete for similar material and social resources in a 
well-defmed geographic area .. .' 
The question  is whether this  critique should  be  seen as  an advantage or a 
disadvantage for organizational ecology. In other words, should organizational ecology 
be considered as a theory which 'competes' with industrial organization to explain the 
evolution of industries or as one that complements the economic models? 
As argued in the section of this paper which discusses the links of organizational 
ecology with industrial organization, we clearly think that both should be seen as 
complements to each other. Indeed, industrial organization has little to say about the 
evolution of those industries or populations where demand is of minor importance or 
does not exist as yet. This review has shown that it were exactly those populations that 
have been the focus of interest during the past decade. 
However, we have also argued that both intellectual streams can be integrated along 
the life cycle of an industry. Economists typically study the evolution of an industry 
from the moment on that demand is present or, in other words, that products are sold in 
the market. It is exactly from this point on that carrying capacity becomes endogenous 
to the density model (see also Brittain, 1994). Product sales generate internal cash flow 
to the organization or at a higher level of analysis, to the industry, which in tum can be 
used to enlarge the carrying capacity of the environment. A large body of anecdotal 
information on this endogenization process is available in qualitative studies of regional 
development such as Saxenian's analysis of Silicon Valley and Route 128 (Saxenian, 
1994). But before demand is sufficient to guarantee the survival of the industry, it is the 
resource environment which determines the selection process of organizations.  As 
argued in the paper, this period before product sales sustain the industry and hence 
before endogenization of carrying capacity takes place, can have important implications 
for analyzing the further growth of the industry once demand is generated. 
The nature of this problem is related to the sample selection bias which has received 
so much attention among labor economists, analyzing the determinants of labor supply 
(Heckman, 1979). The focal question of interest in these studies is how wages affect 
the amount of labor supplied (measured in hours) by each individual. However, this 
equation is by definition conditional upon participation in the labor force. If one only 
includes those people that work in the sample, then the study suffers from a sample 
selection bias. Therefore, labor economists started to estimate a labor participation 
--40--equation which they integrate in the labor supply model. Of course, other factors may 
determine the choice to work or not than the amount of work one wants to do. Similar 
to the labor economics example, other processes may determine the growth of an 
organization's product sales than its participation decision in an industry. The density 
dependence model has most value to estimate the industry participation decsion whereas 
economic models  provide most insight in  the  determinants  of growth equation. 
Integrating density dependence models with economic theory along the industry life 
cycle is a very promising area of further research. 
Also when  an industry matures,  demand decreases  in  importance again and 
organizations become again more dependent on the carrying capacity of the resource 
environment, which however may consist of totally different dimensions that the one in 
the  emerging stages of an  industry.  We have  given the  populations  of generic 
manufacturers and breweries as two examples of such maturing industries. 
Finally,  the  empirical  part of the  paper has  shown that despite  the  fact  that 
organizational ecology uses increasingly complex and better suited techniques to study 
the evolution of populations, one main caveat remains: the distribution of errors which 
result from  unobserved heterogeneity. This problem should be addressed both at a 
theoretical and an empirical level. At the theoretical side, further exploring the multi-
dimensionality of the carrying capacity concept can provide some further insights in this 
problem, which in turn may provide the necessary input to empirically determine 
appropriate distributions. 
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Density variable split up at the city, state 
and national level (same results for each 
variable, V-shaped relationship) 
Control  Variables 
age: number of years since founding (-) 










Gompertz Finnish Newspapers, 1771- Dependent  Variable 
1963, Amburgey, Kelley  failures, mergers and acquisitions were 
and Barnett (1993)  treated as competing risks. 
Seven Medical Equipment 
Product Markets, 1952-
1982,  Mitchell (1994) 
Independent  Variables 
content changes: changes in activity (n.s.) 
frequency changes: (-) 
age: time since founding (-) 
Control  Variables 
various environmental characteristics 
Dependent  Variables 
Dissolutions including both voluntary 
liquidations and bankruptcies and 
Di vestitures 
Independent  Variables 
Age: time elapsed since founding of the 
organization (+ in the divestiture case, - in 
the dissolution case, but only for start-up 
firms) 
Control  Variables 
Size:  sales (- on dissolution rates, but n.s. 
on divestitures) 






Barnett and Amburgey 
(1990) 
Dependent  Variable  Gompertz 
failings, no further info reported 
Independent  Variables 
mass: sum of the sizes of all organizations 
in the population (n.s.) 
Credit Unions in New York  Dependent  Variable 
City, 1914-1990, Barron,  failings, all other exits were treated as 
West and Hannan (1994)  censored observations 
Independent  Variables 
size: assets (consumer loans) (+) 
age: years since founding (+, 
nonmonotonic) 
Control  Variables 
environment. Dummy variable, with linear 
trend after change (-) 
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Weibull Manhattan Hotel Industry, 
1898-1990, Baum and 
Mezias (1992) 
Legend: 
Dependent  Variable 
failures, no further info reported 
Independent  Variables 
size localized competition:  Euclidean 
distance between sizes within a size 
window, rt.  - "(SO-SI)' (-) 
",~. 
price localized competition:  Euclidean 
distance between sizes within a size 
window C-) 
geographically localized competition: 
Euclidean distance between sizes within a 
size window (-) 
Control  Variables 
demand: number of visitors to NYC C  -) ; 
GNP growth rate C  -) 
size: number of hotel beds C  -) 
age: years since founding C+) 
left Censor: dummy for left censoring, 
about 25% was left censored (n.s.) 
(+) means a statistically significant (p<.05) positive sign. 
(-) means a statistically significant (p< .05) negative sign. 
(n.s.) means not significant at the .05 level. 
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loglinear TABLE  7: A  SELECI'ED OVERVIEW OF STIJDIES ON FNrRY AND FOUNDING 
DATASET/STUDY  KEY VARIABLES 
Day Care Centers in  Dependent Variable 
Toronto, 1971-1989; Baum  foundings, no further info reported 
and Singh (1994) 
Independent  Variables 
overlap density:  (-) 
nonoverlap density: (+) 
California Loan and Savings  Dependent Variable 
Industry, 1977-1986,  entries in emerging subfields in the Loan 
Haveman (1993)  and Savings Industry by Incumbents 
Transgene Plant 
Community, 1974-1994 & 
Dutch Venture Capital 
Industry, 1980-1994, 
Debackere, Clarysse and 
Manigart, (1995). 
Independent  Variables 
mimetic isomorphism:  number of 'large' 
firms in the subfield (inverted-U shape, 
significant) 
size: financial assets (+) 
Control  Variables 
several environment-specific variables 
Dependent Variable 
f  oundings of research groups, Dutch 
venture capital firms. 
Independent  Variables 
Clique Membership: relative number of 
organizations that belong to an industry-
wide exchange network ( -) 
Mimetic Isomorphism: concentration of 
network prestige (+) 
Control  Variables 
environment specific variables. 
US Biotech Industry, 1974- Dependent Variable 
1987; Shan, Singh and  foundings of new biotech firms. 
Amburgey (1991) 
Independent  Variables 
Density: inverted-U shaped relationship 
(significant) 
Control  Variables 



































Model Rural Cooperative Banks in 
Italy,  1~v4-1988 ; Lomi 
(1995) 
Seven Medical Equipment 
Product Markets, 1952-
1982,  Mitchell (1994) 
Pennsylvania Telephone 
Companies, 1877-1933, 
Barnett and Amburgey 
(1990) 
Legend: 
Dependent  Variable 
foundings, no further info available. 
Independent  Variables 
geographic density: density in well-defined 
geographic niches (+) 
Control  variables 
general economic and social conditions 
such as 
Agricultural employment (n.s.) 
Core Bank's share (+) 
Dependent  Variables 
entry by industry incumbents into emerging 
technological subfields 
Independent  Variables 
Specialized Assets, defined as 
industry market share (+, in the logistic 
regression) 
industry experience (n.s.) 
direct distribution system (+, in the logistic 
regression and -, in accelerated time failure 
model) 
Control  Variables 
Potential Rivals (-, in time failure models) 
Dependent  Variable 
foundings 
Independent  Variables 
mass: sum of the sizes of all organizations 
in the population (  +) 
(+  ) means a statistically significant (p<.05) positive sign. 
(-) means a statistically significant (p< .05) negative sign. 































distribution TABLE 8: A  SELECfED OVERVIEW OF STIJDIES ON CHANGE AND GROwrn 
DATASET/STUDY  KEY VARIABLES 
Day Care Centers in  Dependent Variable 
Toronto, 1971-1989 ; Baum  growth, measured as the relative change in 
and Mezias (1993)  licensed capacity 
Independent  Variables 
size-localized competition:  (+), dense areas 
in the size distribution inhibit growth. 
institutional linkages: (+), institutional 
linkages have a strong positive effect on 
growth. 
mass density:  (n.s.), mass has no effect 
on growth. 
Control  Variables 
lagged organizational size: «1), rejection of 
Gibrat's Law, growth monotonic declines 
with increasing size. 
age: (-) growth was significantly lower for 
older organizations. 
several environmental control variables 
California Loan and Savings  Dependent Variable 
I  nd  ustry, 1977-1986,  rate of investment in a non-traditional 
Haveman (1993)  market. 
Independent  Variables 
size: total assets, hypothesized inverted-U 
shaped relationship, confirmed in four of 
the seven markets. 
Control  Variables 
organizational age: the number of years 
since incorporation. 




























icity, but not 
for sample 
selection 
biases) Credit Unions in New York  Dependent  Variable 
City, 1914-1990 ; Barron,  growth in terms of assets 
West and Hannan (1994) 
Independent  Variables 
lagged size: assets for each Union «1, 
rejection of Gibrat's Law, monotonic 
decreasing influence). 
age: time elapsed since founding of the 
Union (n.s. for the piecewise and Weibull 
model). 
lnage: significant (-). 
Control  Variables 
Density variables (inverted U-shape relation 
with growth). 
American Telephone  Dependent  Variable 
Companies, invention of the  Growth 
telephone -> 1934 
Legend: 
Independent  Variables 
Competition from Bell: number of 
subscribers to Bell  (+) 
Technologies Used number of companies 
that use the superior or inferior technology 
(+) 
Age: time elapsed since founding 
(+  ) means a statistically significant (p<.05) positive sign. 
(-) means a statistically significant (p< .05) negative sign. 
(n.s.) means not significant at the .05 level. 
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fixed effects 
model, no 
further 
correction for 
autocorrelatio 
n, 
heteroskedast 
icity and 
sample 
selection bias 
Fixed effect 
regression 
model, 
correction for 
heteroskedast 
icity and 
serial 
correiation, 
correction for 
sample 
selection bias 